

Allies against the Rising Sun: The United States, the British Nations, and the Defeat of Imperial Japan, by Nicholas Evan Sarantakes. Modern War Studies. Lawrence, Kansas, The University Press of Kansas, 2009. xxi, 458 pp. \$39.95 US (cloth).

Nicholas Sarantakes, an associate professor at the US Naval War College and the author of two previous books about World War II-era Okinawa, focuses on alliance politics and coalition warfare to explain the conclusion of the war in the Pacific theatre in 1945. While the story of the development and deployment of the atomic bomb is the more familiar one of the war's end, Sarantakes convincingly argues that Japan's defeat depended on a united Allied effort in the Pacific. The United Kingdom and its dominions agreed to become part of this because of deep-rooted issues connected with empire and international politics. Sarantakes rejects the emphasis on the disagreements between these Allied countries — a view promoted by scholars like Christopher Thorne and John Sbraga — and demonstrates that these “honest” disputes about policy options did not prevent an effective working relationship.

It is a long, detailed story that stretches across seventeen chapters bracketed by an introduction and a conclusion, plus an epilogue. The subject matter of the book can be broken down into two basic parts. Chapters one through seven foreground the extensive negotiations and planning that laid the foundations for the participation of Britain and several of its commonwealth countries in the Pacific war. The remaining chapters then cover the military action of the story.

Sarantakes's opening of the introduction is awkward, with its focus on the 1972 funeral of US President Harry S. Truman. Of all of the narrative hooks that could have been employed to draw the reader into this slice of World War II political-military history, this is an odd choice. Truman does not appear again for more than two hundred pages — alive this time — when some of the policy issues between the Allies have already been worked out. The author uses the rest of the introduction to lay out the argument of his book, which is nicely done, but he does not get around to explaining any connection to Truman's funeral.

The first chapter opens with Sir Andrew Browne Cunningham's arrival at Whitehall as a member of Great Britain's Chiefs of Staff committee. At the beginning of 1943 he had been promoted to Admiral of the Fleet, so he joined Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff, and Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, as advisors to Prime Minister Winston Churchill on the conduct of the war. The three officers had a good working relationship, even became fast friends, which served them well through debates over the role that the United Kingdom should play in the Pacific war once Germany had been defeated. While the Chiefs of Staff envisioned sending four British divisions to the Pacific in preparation for the invasion of Japan, Churchill wanted to use the troops to liberate Singapore from the Japanese, thereby taking the first step in rebuilding the British Empire. The Prime Minister clashed with his Chiefs over objectives and strategies well into 1944.

The interests of the self-governing dominions of the United Kingdom complicated the disagreements between these men. Canada, New Zealand, and Australia all had a stake in the outcome of the war in the Pacific, and their interests did not necessarily coincide with each other or with Great Britain. Churchill called the prime ministers of these dominions to a meeting in London in May 1944, along with the leaders of South Africa, Rhodesia, and India, to hammer out an agreement. Though the conference reaffirmed the co-operation between the countries it did not produce a unanimously agreed-upon plan. The following month, Churchill met with his Chiefs of Staff and their American counterparts in London. Operation OVERLORD was about a week old, and the success of the D-Day landings made discussion of the Pacific war even more imperative, yet it ended the same as the London conference. Military leaders met again in September, this time in Quebec with US President Franklin Roosevelt joining the group, this time with enough agreement to put plans into motion.

Canada was an important part of this military effort. It was one of four powers in the North Pacific, so it had an immediate interest in the outcome of the Pacific war and wanted a say in the shaping of post-war Japan. Still, Prime Minister Mackenzie King had to deal with a domestic population skeptical of the necessity of expanding their contributions to the war effort. His own Cabinet was wary as well. The prime minister's solutions to these concerns were, as Sarantakes puts it, messy. Still, the Canadians stuck to their commitment.

The second half of the book is a riveting account of the 1945 joint Allied effort to defeat Japan. From the American Major General Curtis LeMay and the precision night bombings of Japanese cities to the sea and land battles of Okinawa to US President Harry Truman's decisions about invasions and bombings, Sarantakes ably moves through the final months of World War II. His talents as a military historian and his expertise on Okinawa shine through here. Though the book would have been sharper without the extensive use of block quotations and without digressions into the personal backgrounds of the major personalities, it is clearly a valuable contribution to the historiography of World War II in the Pacific.

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The Other Alliance: Student Protest in West Germany and the United States in the Global Sixties, by Martin Klimke. Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 2010. xvi, 346 pp. \$39.50 US (cloth).

The analytical assessment of the rebellious spirit of the 1960s, a flourishing heritage industry, has not traditionally centred on the events in the West Germany of that time. Public memory has dwelled more assiduously on other locations, with Paris as the ultimate summit, while the iconic role of Germany emerged in the