

Dead Beef and Live Soldiers

Lyndon Johnson, Keith Holyoake, and
U.S.-New Zealand Relations in the 1960s

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The focus of this article is the “friendship” between Lyndon Johnson, president of the United States, and Keith Holyoake, prime minister of New Zealand, and how it influenced the diplomatic relationship their two countries had with one another. Johnson and Holyoake were the masters of their political systems and dominated the political life of their countries in the 1960s. With similar rural backgrounds and professions, they understood one another and treated the foreign policy of their two countries as a series of political deals. Johnson’s most important concern was garnering support for the United States’ initiative in Vietnam, while Holyoake wanted to make sure that New Zealand had access to American markets for its agricultural exports.

IN THE 1960s two men dominated politics and policymaking in the United States and New Zealand: Keith Holyoake, prime minister of New Zealand, and Lyndon Johnson, president of the United States of America. Despite coming from two different nations and societies, Johnson and Holyoake shared rural roots, which gave them some common ground. At the same time, their political goals both during their career and as leaders of their countries were extremely divergent. Johnson’s focus was always to reform America and achieve his “Great Society.” Holyoake wanted to

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move New Zealand through a difficult economic transition, as it expanded its trading network beyond the British Empire. Both men saw the war in Vietnam as an obstacle, thwarting them from their main purpose. Johnson needed the conflict resolved before attention and funds could be focused on domestic reform, while Holyoake realized that New Zealand had to offer some help in the unpopular war to maintain a favorable trade relationship with America. Thus, during the 1960s, trade in cattle and soldiers in Vietnam became inextricably linked as bargaining chips in U.S.-New Zealand relations.¹

Johnson had a rural Texas upbringing. He was born in the central part of the state in 1908. Even though his father served in the Texas House of Representatives and his maternal grandfather was Texas Secretary of State, Johnson knew rural poverty firsthand. He attended Southwest Texas State Teachers College and trained as a teacher, a career he practiced for a short time before moving into politics. Despite his rapid transition to the national political arena, he never lost his rural Texas roots, acquiring ranch land outside the small town where he grew up, and calling himself a cattleman, which was a designation of some importance in Texas (Figure 1).²

From the beginning, Johnson focused on domestic policy matters. In 1954 he became the new Senate Majority Leader, the youngest ever, and was responsible for getting a number of important pieces of legislation enacted, including the first civil rights bill since the end of Reconstruction. He had a strong understanding of the Senate and the strengths and weaknesses of its individual members, which made him one of the most influential persons to ever sit in that assembly. Had he never made it to the White House, he still would have been an exceptionally important figure in American history.³

Because of his strength in domestic politics, it was inevitable that many would consider him weak in foreign policy. This criticism always rankled him. During the presidential election of 1960, he pointed out that he had served on a number of committees in Congress that required knowledge about military matters and foreign policy. "I suppose sitting in on all those meetings with Eisenhower and passing on foreign aid and every major foreign policy bill in the last twenty years isn't good experience," he remarked.⁴

Johnson had served in the navy during the Second World War, which gave him his first exposure to New Zealand. In 1942 at the suggestion of



Figure 1. Publicity shot of President Lyndon Baines Johnson courtesy of North Dakota Institute for Regional Studies, Fargo, North Dakota

President Roosevelt, he took an inspection trip to the Southwest Pacific. He spent three days in New Zealand before leaving for the headquarters of General Douglas MacArthur in Australia. He was impressed with the natural beauty of New Zealand and also left the South Pacific with a deep sense of gratitude to the island nation. While in New Zealand on his way home, he became seriously ill. He insisted on continuing his trip, but by the time his plane reached the Fiji Islands, he was even sicker. Two New Zealand physicians treated him, while he spent five days in a military hospital. He credited these two men with saving his life.⁵

Despite these experiences, Johnson, like many Americans, tended to think of Australia and New Zealand as one entity. In 1964 he started off a meeting with Brian Talboys, the New Zealand minister of agriculture,

expressing the strong admiration and affection he had for the people of New Zealand and Australia. There was nothing wrong with those flattering comments, and Johnson had the good taste to mention New Zealand before Australia. The president then went on, according to the note taker writing the minutes of the meeting, offering Talboys some strange praise, “he said that no part of the world resembled the State of Texas more than Australia, its people, its economic structure, its individuality, and its style of life.” There is no mention of how Talboys responded to these comments about a foreign nation.⁶

Like Johnson, Holyoake spent his childhood in a rural, farm community. The third of seven children, he was born in Pahiatua in 1904 and acquired the nickname “Kiwi Keith” to distinguish himself from a cousin from Australia who attended his school and had the same name. At age twelve, when his father’s health declined, he ended his formal education to work on the family farm. His mother was a former schoolteacher and made sure his education continued on at home in the evenings.⁷

His rural roots continued to influence his life in politics. As prime minister, he presented himself as an ordinary Kiwi. His phone number was in the Wellington phone book, and when he took office he refused to use expensive wallpaper to redecorate his official residence. The only sources of relief from the demands of his office were his farm and his garden, which produced most of the vegetables consumed in the prime minister’s residence. There are stories of police pulling over an official government vehicle with a trailer full of cattle dung, only to discover that the driver was none other than the prime minister himself.⁸

Holyoake entered politics in the early 1930s, and his involvement in public affairs would last for over five decades. Walt W. Rostow, Johnson’s National Security Advisor, told the president, “Holyoake is a consummate politician.” This description was one that resonated with Johnson; he could understand and work with this fellow from New Zealand. There were many similarities between these two men. Like Johnson, Holyoake was not one to leave a paper trail. He liked to rule through consensus, instead of trying to impose his will on others. Historian Tom Brooking suggests this leadership style arose from Holyoake’s background in tobacco, fruit, and hop farming, where the seasonal fluctuations in the needs for labor required that producers in these sectors work in cooperation with one another. This approach to administration gave many members of his

party and cabinet strong motivation beyond that of simple party loyalty and discipline in maintaining a government in which they had influence.⁹

Such leadership helped New Zealand make its way through the turbulent 1960s. The nation went through a period of material and social mobility among its citizenry, and significant economic growth that made it an urban rather than rural society. There was also a good deal of social and technological change. The old, imperial relationship with the United Kingdom was beginning to fade, trading patterns were becoming more diverse, the nation was drawing closer to Australia, bankers and officials in the finance ministry were seeking foreign loans from places other than London, and the public was making anti-racial discrimination a matter of public policy. Despite or rather because of his limited formal schooling, Holyoake was a major champion of education while in office. Funding to universities in New Zealand increased dramatically during his tenure.¹⁰

As in the United States, the Vietnam War was an extremely divisive issue in New Zealand politics. During the 1966 national election, a crowd shouted down the Prime Minister. Holyoake also left a political assembly early as the crowd made its hostile feelings known. Despite popular opinion, Holyoake realized that he would have to make some commitment to the war to ensure a positive relationship with America. His solution was to make a small commitment to South Vietnam and to lead the way in trying to find a peaceful resolution to the war. Roberto Rabel, the official historian of New Zealand's involvement in Vietnam, notes that, while the prime minister was the individual most responsible for sending troops to Vietnam, he was also quite good at limiting the size of that commitment.¹¹

The relationship between Johnson and Holyoake reveals a good deal about these two men, and the policies that the governments of the United States and New Zealand pursued in the 1960s. The first time Johnson asked Holyoake for political assistance came in 1964 and involved agrarian trade issues. Even though Johnson was from the bigger, more powerful nation and had a fixed term in office, he was the first to need political assistance of the two. He would also need to seek political favors from Holyoake more often and would ask for bigger compromises than the New Zealand prime minister would ever ask of him.

The first issue Johnson needed help with revolved around the amount of beef New Zealand sent to the United States. Cattle prices in the United States were sliding downward. In 1964 a banker in rural Iowa told

the *New York Times* that the average cattle feeder doing business with his institution had lost between \$3,000 and \$10,000 in the previous year. These dropping prices corresponded with an increase in the amount of foreign beef exported into the United States. New Zealand and Australia were the two countries that sent the most beef to the United States. In 1957 New Zealand shipped a little over 50,000,000 pounds, which made it the largest exporter to the United States. By 1963 the poundage was 235,000,000, a five-fold increase. Despite this growth, New Zealand had fallen to second place behind Australia, which went from a paltry 5,000,000 pounds to 516,923,000. Many people in the United States cattle industry blamed the falling prices on the foreign imports. One Iowa cattleman told the *New York Times* that “most of the loss can be directly attributed to the importation of foreign beef.”¹²

Republicans sensed political opportunity in the coming election with this trade dispute. Party leaders began advocating protectionist trade legislation against foreign beef. This initiative put Johnson and many other influential Democrats in a difficult position. Like the president, many congressional leaders for the Democrats came from cattle-producing states where the livestock industry was a key constituency. It would be difficult for these Democrats to vote against bills that offered the promise of protection to important business in their home districts and states. The Republicans foresaw a win-win situation. The party would either get credit for passing the legislation or would make Johnson look bad for going against his party, when he vetoed what he thought was an unwise bill. Johnson knew he was in a political bind and that many Democratic leaders in Congress were vulnerable on this issue. “If this hits the House, it will just be a Republican move and they will win the votes,” he told Senator Clinton Anderson of New Mexico. “It will hurt us,” he informed his fellow Democrat, “and it will hurt me as a cowman having to veto it.”¹³

Johnson attributed the drop in prices to the vast domestic surplus in the number and size of livestock. “We’ve got an oversupply. There’s no question about that. We all know that,” he told Senator Jack Miller of Iowa in early 1964. “While the imports are inconsequential in the total picture, most of the cattlemen think that is what’s causing it, and so we got . . . to take some action.” He was particularly upset, because the gamesmanship of an election year was putting the larger economic interests of the United States, as well as that of the livestock industry itself, at

risk. He told Anderson, "We ship \$24 billion worth of stuff out of here every year and we only bring in only 18 billion, so we can't raise too much hell about the people sending stuff in when we are sending it out ourselves and we got a 6 billion balance." He worried that America would soon find itself slipping into a trade war. "Now if we come along and by legislation say we are going to cut out this and they come along by legislation and say we're going to cut off that much more for America and it just starts a damn gang war." What he found particularly frustrating was that the legislation was unnecessary. "We can get the same results without it."¹⁴

Most non-political observers on the issue were closer to the views of Johnson than they were to that of the Republicans. Kenneth Egerston, an economist at the University of Minnesota, told the *New York Times* that American producers had sent a record number of animals to market in 1963. An Iowa rancher was blunter, telling a reporter from the paper, "There are just too damn many cattle." Republicans and the leaders of trade organizations in the industry responded by saying that a saturated domestic market was the worst possible moment for a flood of imports.¹⁵

There was some merit to this contention, but it was also deceptive. The domestic cattle industry was primarily a victim of its own success. Even without foreign competition, ranchers and farmers in the United States were so productive and efficient that they produced more than the domestic market could consume. Federal corn subsidies made cattle feed exceptionally cheap and stimulated growth. Liberal capital gains provisions in the tax code also encouraged development. When cattle increased in value by maturing, stockmen could claim this new wealth as a capital gains rather than income, and, thus, pay income taxes at a lower rate. Finally, there was the cyclical nature of industry. When prices are high, the tendency is to produce more; however, an increase in supply lowers profits. After reviewing these factors, Senator Paul Douglas of Illinois, a former professor of economics at the University of Chicago, commented, "I think the cattlemen have identified the wrong difficulty in saying that it has been the importations from Australia and New Zealand which have primarily caused the fall in prices, when, as a matter of fact, this has been due primarily to the operations of the cattle cycle and the unduly favorable grants in the tax structure to the cattle industry."¹⁶

Despite the weakness of his opponents' arguments, Johnson was facing a problem that required action on his part. His solution was to avoid official

quotas, but to try and establish an understanding with New Zealand and Australia to limit the amount of beef they exported to the United States. "I am stayin' out of the papers on it, because I think that we can get the agreement if we can stay out of them. I'm afraid if we get in 'em, we'll, we'll, we'll bust it up and they'll start hollering were a bunch of protectionists that are trying to impose quotas," he told Miller. Well aware of the political volatility of the issue, he wanted the Iowa Republican to know that he was not taking the matter lightly. Miller quickly trashed any hope Johnson might have had that these remarks would have some impact on him. The senator stayed focused on the theme that the Australian and New Zealand imports were ruining the domestic cattle industry. Johnson was no political lightweight and continued to stress his message. The net result was that two men talked past one another.¹⁷

Johnson's scheme worked relatively smoothly. Under Secretary of State George Ball, the number two man in the State Department, handled the talks with the New Zealanders and Australians. Ambassador George Laking of New Zealand was "happy to come in and talk further with Ball on beef." The meetings moved along well, according to Ball. "I have no serious doubts that we will be able to work it out," he told Jack Valenti, a senior advisor to the president. The only request that Laking made on the matter came from Holyoake, which Ball relayed to the White House. The prime minister wanted to avoid having the Americans describe the talks publicly as "negotiations."

Valenti was confused. "They don't like the word negotiation," he asked.

"No," Ball replied. "Because it suggests that we are dickering with them on a quid pro quo basis and they don't think this is that kind of situation." Valenti agreed to this request.¹⁸

Despite this work with Laking, Ball focused on Australia in the discussions that followed. "I think New Zealand will come in on any deal we make with Australia," he explained to his counterpart in the USDA, Charles S. Murphy. New Zealand had hit the limits of its production capacity and was unlikely to ship as much to the United States in 1964 as it had done previously. In fact, with a beef famine developing in the United Kingdom, editorials in Kiwi newspapers were calling on farmers to make greater efforts to increase production so New Zealand could help the mother country in this difficult moment and secure a dominate position in the British market.¹⁹

All told the talks took about six weeks, and in February the State Department released a series of notes between the three governments in which New Zealand and Australia agreed to limit the amount of beef they sent to the United States. The amount they would ship would be equal to the average each country exported to the United States in 1963 and 1964 with 3.7 percent added for expected growth.²⁰

The agreement was less than satisfactory to the cattle industry. When Secretary of Agriculture Orville L. Freeman declared, "Livestock producers will benefit materially and immediately" from the agreement, it angered Charles B. Shuman, president of the American Farm Bureau Federation. "I couldn't disagree with you more," he stated in a letter to the secretary. "We have had enough experience with international commodity agreements to know that they are worse than worthless in promoting and protecting the interests of farmers and ranchers." Many others in the agriculture sector shared these views. Brooks J. Keogh, president of the American National Cattlemen's Association, explained what would satisfy the livestock industry, "Our only hope is for legislation to establish more reasonable quotas on indiscriminate and ruinous imports." In May the editorial board of the *Stockman's Journal* called for the passage of just such a bill. "The meat import problem will not really be solved, either, until a firm law is on the books, spelling out in detail what can be imported and how much."²¹

Congressional Republicans were even sharper in their criticisms, blaming Johnson and imports for the decline in beef prices, thinking this issue was a sure vote-getter in cattle-producing western states. One of the most partisan blasts came from Senator Milward Simpson of Wyoming, "The drastic and crippling damage done to our cattlemen by the beef imports does not need to be restated. The foreign imports have been extremely detrimental to our economy." Simpson made it clear who was responsible for this sorry state of affairs. "This administration has been totally irresponsible in meeting the problems created by beef imports." Senator Wayne Morse, the unpredictable Oregon Republican turned Independent turned Democrat, was one of the few members of Congress to turn his wrath directly on the nations responsible for exporting this foreign beef. "I have no tears to weep over Australia, New Zealand, and other countries which want to flood the American market," he declared. Edmond Edmondson, a member of the House of Representatives from Oklahoma,

reduced the Republican political/policy agenda into one simple sentence, "We need legislation."²²

Congress tried to do just that very thing. Senator Roman Hruska of Nebraska offered an amendment that would establish import quotas on foreign beef to a bill to provide a subsidy for cotton and wheat farmers. The Senate rejected the amendment by 46–44. "There is no end to the demands of the farm lobby," the editorial board of the *New York Times* observed of this effort, noting that Americans would be paying for the meat twice: first as taxpayers for the subsidies of the feed for the cattle; and second as consumers in higher prices due to a lack of supply.²³

Congressional agitation over beef imports, at least in the case of New Zealand, was much ado about nothing. While the percentage of Kiwi exports going to Great Britain was decreasing, going from 53 percent in 1960 to 46 percent in 1963, the British were still New Zealand's single largest trading partners. To offset this decline, Holyoake's government tried throughout the 1960s to diversify its foreign markets. These efforts were largely successful. While the United States was one of the many new trading partners that New Zealand acquired in that decade, in 1970 it only accounted for 16 percent of Kiwi trade. Most agricultural exports were still going to the United Kingdom. In 1966, 88 percent of the cheese, 94 percent of the lamb, and over 90 percent of the butter exported from New Zealand ended up in Great Britain. Following changes in European diets in the mid-1960s made beef more popular, giving New Zealand new markets for their exports. These consumers were also easy to reach through the portal of the United Kingdom. When the president met with Brian Talboys at the White House, one of the questions he asked his guest was how New Zealand had managed to reduce exports to the United States by 22 percent below the agreed upon levels. Talboys said it was quite simple; New Zealand firms had received large orders from purchasers in many western European countries. Market forces along with advice from the government, had convinced exporters to redirect their business towards Europe rather than to keep dealing with the United States.²⁴

Had European trade expansion not existed as an alternative, Holyoake might have been less willing to compromise with Johnson. Despite migration to Kiwi cities, agriculture was still the largest sector in the economy of New Zealand, and the nation still relied on a narrow range of export products in the wool, dairy, and meat industries. The beef import

issue was a nuisance to Johnson, but a matter of fundamental significance to Holyoake. At the meeting with Talboys, Johnson “expressed gratification” for New Zealand’s efforts. Towards the end of the meeting, the president predicted that Congress would make another effort to establish import quotas. “New Zealand had helped us to overcome the recently surmounted Congressional problem and by its continued restraint could help us again.”²⁵

Johnson was correct in foreseeing continued congressional problems concerning beef prices. “One of the big problems today is beef,” he told the Newspaper Farm Editors Association. In private he was more alarmed. He told George Ball that he was worried that it could cost him the election. Republicans in Congress continued to hammer the president with the issue. Representative John Anderson of Illinois declared in the House, “Mr. Speaker, the problems confronting the livestock industry in the United States are very serious.” Over in the Senate, Hruska announced, “the administration’s plans for solving the difficulty will not do the job.”²⁶

Many in the ranching industry had similar opinions. Two days before the Senate vote, people laughed and booed Assistant Secretary of Agriculture George Mehren when he appeared at a meeting of ranchers concerned about beef imports and said, “We did a good job. We did the best we could.” Frank Morrison, the Democratic governor of Nebraska, got loud applause when he told the same group that Congress should invest more power in the office of the secretary of agriculture to limit agricultural imports. The California state legislature passed a resolution noting that the agreements with Australia and New Zealand did nothing to alleviate the problems that American cattlemen faced and requesting that the United States Congress establish quotas limiting the influx of foreign meat into the United States “below the recordbreaking beef import years of 1962 and 1963.”²⁷

Johnson was also taking a pounding in regional and trade publications. A reporter for the *St. Louis Globe Democrat* announced that the “livestock industry today is mortally sick.” An editorial appearing in the *Denison Bulletin* of Denison, Iowa, declared, “We wonder again how any farmer can vote for the present Democratic administration in the light of recent activity by both the Department of State and the Department of Agriculture with regard to meat imports.” While in Nebraska, a *Norfolk*

Daily News editorial blasted Johnson and Freeman for treating beef imports as a “minor irritant.”²⁸

In an effort to take advantage of Johnson’s difficulties, the Republicans in the Senate introduced new legislation to establish beef import quotas as an amendment to a bill on wildlife imports for zoos. As the battle progressed, members of Congress representing districts and states with heavy agrarian interests supported the legislation. Opponents represented heavy urban areas, since it had the potential to raise their constituents’ food prices. In keeping with the urban/rural divide, when the legislation passed, the editorial board of the biggest newspaper in the biggest city in the country blasted it. “The Senate’s demand for stiff new quotas on imports of meat is a clear demonstration of the power of a political pressure group in an election year,” the editors of the *New York Times* declared. “In taking this step the Senate has let short-term political considerations prevail over economics.” The United States was the largest exporter of agricultural products, “but cattlemen have made imports a scapegoat to conceal their own mistakes in overestimating demand.” Such legislation, the paper indicated, would result in a reduction of meat consumption and retaliatory moves by other nations.²⁹

The fears that the editors of the *Times* and the president shared were not long in coming true. In a letter to Johnson, Australian Prime Minister Sir Robert Menzies declared, “I should tell you directly and quite frankly the seriousness with which I view this matter before you decide whether or not the proposed legislation ought to be put into effect.” He added, “I cannot see how the United States could exert effective leadership and expect success in her effort to contain and reduce restrictions on agricultural trade if she herself imposed restrictive action against imports of beef.” In a less than subtle warning of the retaliation the United States could expect, Menzies said the bill the Senate had just passed was the equivalent of Australia cutting off all imports of American tobacco, cotton, tractors, harvesting machines, and aircraft. In New Zealand, an editorial in the *Auckland Star* declared, “If the situation reversed and the New Zealand Government was forced by Parliament to abrogate an agreement only six month[s] old, would not America be justified in complaining that New Zealand was a most unreliable trading nation?”³⁰

Johnson quickly developed a strategy for thwarting the Republicans that would neutralize an issue on which he was vulnerable, reassure the

New Zealanders and Australians, and yet at the same time allow the ranching industry to claim victory. The president knew vetoing the legislation was out of question. Such a move would hurt himself and the unity of the Democratic Party in the coming election. As the battle moved from spotlight of the Senate and House floors to the backrooms of Congress as a conference committee worked out the differences between the two versions of the bill, Johnson got his supporters to add a number of qualifications. The *New York Times* captured the essence of these provisions. "Under the complex formula contained in the bill for authorizing quotas in future years, Administration officials believe that quotas may never be imposed." According to the legislation, quotas would go into effect if the secretary of agriculture found that imports had exceeded 110 percent of the previous year's total after that figure had been adjusted upward for growth. The new version also gave the president discretionary authority to suspend quotas for any of the following reasons: if he found that there was an overriding economic or national security interest at stake; if quotas would make it impossible to meet domestic needs at reasonable prices; or if trade agreements would meet the objectives of the legislation. One anonymous official from the White House remarked, "We can live with it."³¹

And so too could New Zealand. Holyoake took a moderate position in response to this legislation. He had met with Johnson a week and a half before the Senate vote, but most of that discussion apparently focused on Malaysia. There is no written record of that meeting. In discussing that conversation with reporters, the prime minister never mentioned beef imports. As the legislation moved forward in Congress, Holyoake told reporters in New Zealand that he had indeed talked about meat during the meeting. Either way, he had a good deal of faith in Johnson, understanding that domestic politics, to which the president had to make some response, was driving this legislation. "Much will depend of the interpretation placed upon some sections and the manner in which discretionary powers vested in the President and Secretary of State were exercised," he remarked.³²

Along with a moderate reaction to the cattle import quota legislation, Johnson required assistance from Holyoake on a second matter—Vietnam. The president wanted the allies of the United States to fight in Vietnam alongside American and South Vietnamese soldiers. As historian Robert M.

Blackburn observes, contributions by other nations legitimized the United States' crusade in Southeast Asia, "The most important factor was that an allied nation sent aid, any aid, to South Vietnam, because by so doing that country, ipso facto, showed it supported the U.S. position there." The American military initially opposed any allied contribution. In the past, the difference in equipment, required spare parts, military doctrine, and tactics made coalition warfare a complex proposition. The general and admirals in Washington thought the complications that allies brought with them were not worth the political advantage they offered. There were, however, sound reasons to have allies in Vietnam. A cable that Henry Cabot Lodge, the American ambassador in Saigon, sent on the use of Korean soldiers advanced an irrefutable argument: "I understand that the ROK has well qualified personnel for the type of work where our men are getting killed and wounded. Why not use a few of them here?"³³

Johnson was forthright with Holyoake on the issue of Vietnam. Unfortunately, there are few written records of their meetings. The records that do exist indicate that the tone of their meetings was one of candor; neither saw the other as a political threat. In fact, they both saw the other as a political ally of unusual dependability. The conversation focused on resolving the issue to each other's mutual benefit rather than on the merits of one policy over another. Each told the other what he needed to meet his political needs and what actions he could and could not take. Sometimes the two were too candid for their own good. In 1965 Holyoake called on Johnson at the White House. The meeting was brief and focused on Vietnam. After asking Holyoake about political sentiment in New Zealand, Johnson described political opinion in the United States. According to William Bundy, who took notes of the meeting, "The President commented that division of sentiment in the US was probably roughly 65-35 in favor of Administration policy at the present time, but said that it might become more adverse to perhaps 55-45." Holyoake quickly reassured his host that the United States could depend on New Zealand's support and that his government supported American policy 100 percent. Still, the meeting troubled Bundy. After he finished converting his notes into a memorandum of conversation, he sent a copy with an attached cover memo to his brother, McGeorge, the president's national security advisor. "I have made only two copies of this—one for White House file and one for the FE file—in view of the President's remarks," he explained.³⁴

Given the nature of their relationship, Johnson was more than willing to request help in South Vietnam and was quite honest with the prime minister. He told Holyoake that the fate of Vietnam would affect the security of New Zealand and Australia. "Apart from this, I know you realize how important it is to me that the American people understand they are not alone in the defense of freedom of a country so far away from us." The underlining was the work of Holyoake or A. D. McIntosh, secretary of external affairs, but also makes clear that the Kiwis understood that Johnson was asking for a political favor. The president made the point even more explicit in the closing lines of his letter, "We all know from bitter experience that the freedom in the Pacific is interdependent, and I think it is right to say that the struggle in Vietnam is a struggle for New Zealanders too. It is in this spirit and for this reason that I send this personal appeal for your support." The underlining was again the work of the recipients.³⁵

New Zealand was reluctant to send soldiers to fight in Vietnam. Holyoake and his government had two reasons for hesitating. First, New Zealand already had made a military commitment in Malaysia, which was its first priority in Southeast Asia. Second, the cabinet had profound reservations about South Vietnam. "The West simply cannot achieve from outside a viable political structure for the South Vietnamese. If they cannot—and realism demands that one's estimate be pessimistic—then the West may eventually be faced with failure," Holyoake explained in a reply to Johnson's letter. "Once started it is hard to see that the United States could stop short of the committal of very considerable forces, perhaps to no avail. We would not at present see any justification for such a move and for our own part we could not at this state support any notion that, even if the United States felt obliged to put in a Marine combat group, we would respond in kind."³⁶

Alliance politics soon came into play. In early April 1965 Australia agreed to an American request to send an infantry battalion to Vietnam. New Zealand diplomats realized that this action left them isolated from two of their most important military allies. The Americans knew that the Kiwis were in a difficult position and used it as a lever against them to get some sort of military contribution. After Ambassador George Laking handed him the December cable from Wellington, William Bundy suggested to Dean Rusk, his brother, and a few others, "I think we should let

this lie for the time being, see what the Australian attitude is on this point, and perhaps use the Australians to strengthen the New Zealand view.”³⁷

This suggestion worked, as the two main elements in the national security strategy of New Zealand were its alliance with the United States and its belief in forward defense. In May Holyoake told the nation that they would send troops to fight in that Southeast Asian nation alongside their Australian and American allies. Holyoake underscored the importance of the alliance with the United States in New Zealand foreign policy in the 1960s, saying “that the people in New Zealand all understand ANZUS—Australia, New Zealand, and the United States—the defense treaty. This is the anchor for our safety in the world.”³⁸

With such a solid friend in Wellington, New Zealand became a country Johnson had to visit. He was the first American president to do so. His trip proved to be a remarkable success. During the visit Johnson repeatedly stopped his motorcade or wandered into crowds to meet and greet the individuals that had turned out to see him. As a result, he was late to almost every function, including his departure. After Johnson left, Kiwi journalists assessed: “For size and warmth, no previous civic occasions in Wellington, not even Royal visits, have matched the meeting of President and Mrs. Johnson with Wellingtonians.”³⁹

The brief visit—Johnson was in New Zealand for roughly twenty-four hours—was an enormous success. The editorial board of the *New Zealand Herald* declared, “President Johnson’s personal diplomacy has strengthened immeasurably our bond with the United States.” The editors of the *Evening Post* commented, “Mr. Johnson has, in deceptively simple fashion, brought home to New Zealanders an awareness that Americans and our own people might have a great deal more in common than most of them have hitherto suspected.” The next day the editors made another observation. “New Zealanders now know, far more clearly than before, what motivates the United States and how its President views the struggle and the tasks that will lie ahead when somehow, some day, the side is brought to an end. A good many of our people will now be less uneasy about Vietnam calamitous though its story is, than they were before.”⁴⁰

Public support for Johnson helped Holyoake, who supported intervention in Vietnam because of the New Zealand security doctrine of “forward defense.” The idea behind this concept was extremely simple—engage with any threat to New Zealand as far away from its shores as possible.

“Perhaps it would be appropriate on this occasion for me to point out that probably no country in the world is better placed than New Zealand to be neutral and isolationist. We are 5,000 miles away from the nearest foreign country, Indonesia. We are nearly as far away from Saigon as Saigon is from Paris,” Holyoake told Johnson and others during a visit to the White House. “I hope I can claim with justification that New Zealand—small as we are—that we have always pulled our weight.” New Zealand had an exceptionally important reason for wanting others to think of them as a dependable ally. This small, transplanted British society lacked the resources to defend itself. “Our own vital interest can be safeguarded only by working closely with our friends and allies and people who see life in the way we do.”⁴¹

New Zealand eventually sent troops to Vietnam, but Holyoake limited the commitment with two arguments. First, he pointed out to Johnson several times that New Zealand had already made a military commitment to Malaysia. This position was one that American officials found difficult to refute. No one could claim that New Zealand was shirking its duties. It was already fighting the good fight against communism.

This argument only worked for a while. In the spring of 1965, Australia’s growing commitment in Vietnam, altered the perspective in Washington. Henry Cabot Lodge, the United States ambassador in Vietnam, met with the New Zealand cabinet, basically seeking to recruit volunteers for the war in Vietnam. According to cabinet minutes, the ambassador told the assembled Kiwi politicians, “The effect of anything we did would be out of all proportion to the numbers involved so far as the United States were concerned. Its value would be psychological or symbolic.” The American stressed this point again when Holyoake raised the issue of exactly what type of contribution New Zealand could make in Vietnam. “Mr. Lodge said he thought that a Battery or a Tank Company, or anything, would be welcomed because of the importance the Americans attached to flying more flags.”⁴²

The limitations and constraints of domestic politics was another argument that Holyoake used, which Johnson was far less willing to challenge. “You can’t ask a Senator to slit his own throat,” was a saying that was popular during his days in the Senate. Holyoake made it clear that he would do what he could without infringing on the standard of living of New Zealanders or instituting a draft, which Parliament would never

have approved. This line of reasoning also had the advantage of stressing to the Americans the risks Holyoake had already taken in sending soldiers to Vietnam.⁴³

Unlike his American counterpart, Holyoake was less concerned with the popularity of the Vietnam War with his people. Generally, matters of foreign policy were not political issues to the New Zealand public. In September 1965 the *Otago Daily Times* conducted the only national public opinion poll in New Zealand on the Vietnam War. This survey reported that 70 percent of the public approved of the Holyoake government's decision to send troops to Vietnam. Deputy Prime Minister John Marshall recalled that the public "never really got worked up about Vietnam."⁴⁴

Despite the limitations and constraints that his "friend" in New Zealand faced, Johnson was still willing to ask Holyoake to send more soldiers to Vietnam. In July 1967 Johnson sent General Maxwell Taylor, a former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and U.S. ambassador in Saigon, and Clark Clifford, an influential Washington lawyer who would later enter the administration as secretary of defense, on a tour that took the two to the capitals of the allies that had sent soldiers to Vietnam. Johnson wanted to hold a summit meeting with the presidents and prime ministers of these nations. He also wanted Taylor and Clifford to get additional troop commitments in order to make an increase in the size of the American military in Southeast Asia more tolerable to the American public. "Before I set out, these seemed to me to be eminently reasonable, and achievable, objectives," Clifford recalled.⁴⁵

The two men met with considerable opposition. Clifford later stated that "the troop-contributing nations did not want to contribute any more troops. In fact, with the exception of Korea, they made it clear that they resented having had to send any soldiers to Vietnam in the first place." New Zealand was no different. "Wellington, the capital, was also the site of the only demonstrations against us during our trip. They were small in number and, as protestors go, well behaved—but I jokingly noted to Taylor that more people turned out in New Zealand to demonstrate against our trip than the country had sent to Vietnam." Despite this opposition, the envoys met with Holyoake and his cabinet for four hours. The prime minister stated that a substantial increase would require conscription, which was an unacceptable alternative. Taylor and Clifford believed and told Johnson that Holyoake would increase the number of Kiwis serving

in Vietnam, but they expected that this increase would be less than the battalion the Americans would like. “We came away with much the same overriding impression as in Australia—that this small country feels it has a multitude of difficult fiscal and economic problems at home, including the future of Malaysia and Singapore; that it does believe the outcome in Southeast Asia is important to its national interest and is ‘deeply grateful’ for the U.S. intervention there, but that support in the country for its participation in Viet-Nam is so thin that the Government is prepared to contribute forces only to a point where normal life at home is not affected.”⁴⁶

Even with these limitations, most Americans were pleased with the contributions that New Zealand was making to the crusade in Vietnam. A presidential briefing paper called the New Zealand contribution “credit-able.” Ambassador Powell told Johnson, “New Zealand is a firm friend of the United States and can be expected to stand with us.” His superiors in the State Department had similar views. Nicholas Katzenbach, the under secretary of state, thought quite highly of the Kiwi effort in Vietnam: “While New Zealand’s military contribution to Viet-Nam is small (550 men), Holyoake has been a firm, consistent and articulate supporter of allied policy.” Rusk shared these views. “Please inform Holyoake how much I value the statement of New Zealand views on Vietnam he has had forwarded to us,” he told John F. Henning, the new ambassador in Wellington, during the 1968 peace talks. “I am very pleased that their estimates of the situation in Vietnam [sic] and the perspectives at Paris were so paral- [sic] to our own.” The most important view of New Zealand in the Johnson administration belonged to the president. “We are very proud of our staunch and our farsighted and our courageous friends in New Zealand. You have never waived [sic]. You have never grown soft. You have never feared,” he remarked at a state dinner. He also called the small British nation a “dependable ally” and said he looked at the Kiwis with “great gratitude.”⁴⁷

While Johnson’s main concerns in dealing with New Zealand were to keep the beef lobby quiet and gain military help for Vietnam, Holyoake’s objective was always to improve his nation’s international status. Part of that involved boosting his own and New Zealand’s prestige, by publicly demonstrating his relationship with Johnson. In 1965 for example, Holyoake was in the United States requesting a meeting with the president. George Laking, the New Zealand ambassador in Washington, later

wrote that Holyoake understood “that with changing times a New Zealand Prime Minister by making an impact on the world stage, enhanced his stature at home.” At the White House a National Security Council staff member told one of Johnson’s closest advisors, “Holyoake needs only 5 minutes, literally.” He also informed the president, “Secretary Rusk regards this as a ‘must’ as you met with Australian Prime Minister Menzies earlier this month, and Holyoake has supported us on Vietnam despite intense political opposition at home.” Holyoake got twenty minutes and a candid conversation about public support for the war.⁴⁸

Enhancing personal and national prestige was another factor during Johnson’s 1966 visit to Wellington. Holyoake wanted to discuss trade matters with Johnson when the American attended a meeting of the New Zealand cabinet, but that is all he wanted to do—talk. Rostow informed Johnson that “for political reasons he will raise certain bilateral economic issues; but he understands that you will not give a substantive reply.” When Holyoake introduced the American to the cabinet, he informed his ministers that the two of them had discussed trade issues and the possibility of New Zealand getting greater access to American markets, particularly those for dairy products. Johnson then followed these remarks with an explanation of American foreign policy. Although the bulk of his comments were on Vietnam, Johnson started off by addressing trade matters. He said he was very aware given the size of the two countries that agricultural trade was far more important to New Zealand than it was to the United States. The friendship between the two nations was one that Americans valued, and would not take for granted. Johnson was careful to give his ally what he needed.⁴⁹

In 1968 the prime minister needed to have a more substantial meeting with Johnson. The New Zealand economy was in bad shape, and he needed some assistance from the United States to rectify the matter. Henning, a former under secretary of labor, sent a cable to Washington on what Holyoake was hoping to accomplish with this trip. “Extaff Secretary Laking tells me that DOD purchases and NZ exports of meat and dairy products will be main subjects which Holyoake may raise with President.” In the clipped language of diplomatic cables, Henning explained the Kiwi perspective. “GNZ hopes lamb will not be included in any future U.S. meat quotas. NZ intends continued increase lamb exports to U.S.” Meat was an old issue, but Holyoake was also concerned about dairy products.

“On dairy imports, NZ disappointed that countries unloading products on U.S. market either continue receive quotas while NZ left without quota or receive disproportionately larger quotas than NZ.”⁵⁰

In an explanation that would resonate with Johnson, Henning explained that the prime minister had domestic political concerns at work in raising these issues. “Holyoake government has for past year been under pressure [from] farming interests, which form major part of National Party political base and which charge that GNZ has not adequately present NZ’s case for greater access to U.S. dairy and meat markets.” Henning also added, “With prospect of hard fight in NZ national elections coming up in late 1969, Holyoake will presumably seek carry off visit in way which will deflect criticism at home of ‘one-sided’ U.S./NZ relationship and demonstrate that he is his country’s most effective spokesman.” The same day that the ambassador sent that cable to Washington, he had an opportunity to meet alone with the prime minister. Holyoake confirmed Henning’s predictions about the issues he wished to discuss with Johnson. “As always, he spoke most warmly of America,” the ambassador reported.⁵¹

Acting Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach understood the ramifications of the information Henning was providing—the link between dead beef and live soldiers. He made it quite clear in a briefing paper prepared for Lyndon Johnson that it was in the president’s own interests to help Holyoake. If the prime minister were to lose office, there could be dire repercussions. “The outcome of the election may depend upon economic conditions then prevailing. If Holyoake’s party loses, the Labor opposition (which officially advocates withdrawal from Viet-Nam) will come to power.”⁵²

Holyoake and Johnson met for the last time in October of 1968. The American only had three months left in office, and most foreign leaders were waiting for the inauguration of the new president before traveling to Washington. As a result, Johnson and his administration focused a good deal of attention on Holyoake. Johnson welcomed the prime minister to the White House in a ceremony with full military honors. He also held a state dinner in his guest’s honor that evening. In his previous visits, Holyoake had never been the subject of this type of attention.

In more substantive matters, the New Zealander had a series of meetings with Johnson administration officials to discuss Vietnam and trade issues, including an appointment with Freeman and two with Johnson.

Neither Holyoake nor Johnson was thinking of posterity and there is no written account of their meetings. Yoichi Okamoto, the official White House photographer, provided the only record of these sessions. Okamoto's photographs show two politicians at ease. Holyoake is sitting at the end of the office sofa, puffing away on a cigarette. Johnson is in a high back chair perpendicular to the sofa. Both men are on the edge of their seats and are leaning in towards the other at ease in a conversation about substantial matters. A worry Holyoake brought to this meeting was the status of dairy exports to the United States. Through a United States' importer, the New Zealand government had filed a request with the Department of the Treasury for countervailing duties on subsidized dairy products coming from the European Union. Sooner or later, the Treasury Department would impose these duties and the State Department feared European retaliation against American products. Holyoake told Freeman and Johnson that he would have the request dropped, if New Zealand were included in the quotas the American government was about to announce at the end of the year. Johnson agreed. He also said he would try to increase private loans extended to New Zealand, have the Department of Defense purchase New Zealand lamb for sale in military commissaries and procure as much material and services as possible in New Zealand for the navy's Antarctic exploration program.⁵³

The meeting produced a joint statement from the prime minister and president, the first to follow one of their meetings. Much of this document simply repeated the well-known positions of the two men on Vietnam and security relations between the United States and New Zealand. A section of the text, however, did address trade matters. In it Holyoake "emphasized the importance he and his Government attach to improved access for its primary exports in the developed markets of the world." Johnson, in turn, expressed his "readiness to cooperate with New Zealand in expanding trade and economic cooperation between the two countries." He also promised that "additional measures would be taken to ensure that New Zealand producers and manufacturers have every reasonable opportunity to participate in United States Government overseas procurement activities." While not an iron clad agreement, it did put both men on the record in public in a way that would bolster Holyoake's contention that he was doing a good job of representing the interests of New Zealand overseas.⁵⁴

Despite the different needs of their two nations, Johnson and Holyoake managed to engineer a foreign policy that satisfied both countries. Johnson and the United States wanted to end the war in Vietnam, while Holyoake focused on improving the international position of New Zealand. As a result, these two men, who shared a rural background, had policy agendas that were divergent, but they found ways to bridge these gaps, understand one another, and work together effectively. Johnson and Holyoake handled diplomatic relations between the United States and New Zealand as they would a domestic political problem. Both men were willing to compromise and help the other with his political needs, if he was willing to do the same for them. The foreign policy that resulted was one neither would have developed had they been the sole arbiter of authority in the matter. Yet, both were more than just satisfied with the relationship that developed between these two English-speaking nations during their tenures. Such compromise is the nature of diplomacy. Two decades later, leaders in both countries proved to be far less able in handling divisive issues, suggesting that Johnson and Holyoake were far more effective in world affairs than conventional wisdom would have us believe. That the Johnson-Holyoake treatment of diplomacy worked should hardly be surprising: domestic politics always drives foreign policy. Agrarian trade import issues and troop deployments might not seem like the issues that would be interconnected, but these were the issues that mattered to the two different societies and the politics of the United States and New Zealand were expressions of these interests.

NOTES

1. This article will hopefully make a contribution to three different historiographies. The first is to the development of studies on American policy. Accounts using historical methods on this subject for the period after 1945 are limited in number. This scarcity reflects the fascination historians have shown in the past few decades for social movements rather than public policy or the influence of individual historical actors. There is nothing wrong with the resulting social history, but the government was an institution that many individuals looked to for assistance from their woes, and historians need to be aware of how policy options and decisions shaped American society. Scholars have made efforts to devote more attention to this area of policy. For example, see the individual articles in "Special Issue on Twentieth-Century Farm Policies," *Agricultural History* 70 (Spring 1996): 127–438. For a study of policy concerns involving many of the same people in this account, see James N. Giglio, "New Frontier Agricultural Policy: The Commodity Side, 1961–1963," *Agricultural History* 61 (Summer 1987): 53–70.

The second historiography is the “Beyond Vietnam” debate centering on Lyndon Johnson and world affairs. For years, writers on United States policy dismissed Johnson as a simpleton who was out of his element in the complex arena of international relations. Starting in the 1990s a group of historians challenged this view. The “Longhorn School” contends that Johnson did quite well in directing foreign policy, other than the obvious exception of Vietnam, and had a much stronger background in this area than observers and critics were willing to grant him. The name for the debate comes from H. W. Brands’s book cited below. The term for this school of thought comes from the fact that many of the lead historians, but not all of them, have had some type of professional affiliation with the University of Texas, which has the longhorn as its mascot. Members of this movement include Robert A. Divine, H. W. Brands, Mitchell Lerner, Thomas A. Schwartz, Nicholas Evan Sarantakes, John Prados, Peter Felten, and Randall Woods. See Robert A. Divine, editor, *The Johnson Years*, 3 volumes (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1981–87); H. W. Brands, *The Wages of Globalism: Lyndon Johnson and the Limits of American Power* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); Nicholas Evan Sarantakes, “Lyndon Johnson, Foreign Policy, and the Election of 1960,” *Southwestern Historical Quarterly* 103 (October 1999): 147–74; Nicholas Evan Sarantakes, *Keystone: The American Occupation of Okinawa and U.S.-Japanese Relations* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2000); Mitchell B. Lerner, “Vietnam and the 1964 Election: A Defense of Lyndon Johnson,” *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 25 (Fall 1995): 751–66; Mitchell B. Lerner, *The Pueblo Incident: A Spy Ship and the Failure of American Foreign Policy* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002); H. W. Brands, ed., *The Foreign Policies of Lyndon Johnson: Beyond Vietnam* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1999).

The “been in Texas too long” school is a group of counter-revisionist historians that argues that the early critics were closer to the truth than the Longhorn School would like to admit. These historians contend that Vietnam came to dominate United States foreign policy to the detriment of American interests. The findings of this article suggest that the dominant, popular view of Lyndon Johnson in world affairs needs serious qualification, if not outright rejection. The term originally appeared in Warren I. Cohen and Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, eds., *Lyndon Johnson Confronts the World: American Foreign Policy, 1963–1968* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994) in the context of describing Johnson as a politician with a narrow vision. Cohen has since used the term to describe H. W. Brands, who lives in Austin, Texas, see Cohen, “From Texas with Love: LBJ Confronts Some Parts of the World,” *Diplomatic History* 20 (Fall 1996): 685–88. Historians advancing this view would include Cohen, Tucker, William O. Walker, III, Walter LaFeber, Robert J. McMahon, Douglas Little, David Kaiser, Diane B. Kunz, Michael Schaller, Gerald Thomas, Terrance Lyons, Joseph S. Tulchin, Frank Costigliola, Gerald Thomas, and Waldo Heinrichs. Also see, Michael Schaller, *Altered States: The United States and Japan Since the Occupation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); Diane B. Kunz, ed., *The Diplomacy of the Crucial Decade: American Foreign Relations During the 1960s* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).

The third historiography this article will hopefully contribute to is the growing body of literature on New Zealand’s entry into the Vietnam War. The dominant consensus of works on this topic is that alliance commitments with the United States drove the commitment of New Zealand to send soldiers to Southeast Asia. While not challenging the basic parameters of this view, this article suggests that historians need to add into their accounts the political relationship that existed between the leaders of the United States and New Zealand when trying to explain New Zealand’s commitment. David McCraw, “Reluctant Ally: New

Zealand's Entry into the Vietnam War," *New Zealand Journal of History* 15 (April 1981): 49–60; W. David McIntyre, "The Road to Vietnam," in *The American Connection*, ed. Malcolm McKinnon (Wellington: Allen and Unwin, 1988), 141–47; Roberto Rabel, "A Forgotten First Step on the Road to Vietnam: New Zealand and the Recognition of the Bao Dai Regime, 1950," *New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies* 2 (June 2000); Roberto Rabel, "'The Dovish Hawk': Keith Holyoake and the Vietnam War" in *Sir Keith Holyoake: Towards a Political Biography*, ed. Margaret Clark (Palmerston North, New Zealand: Dunmore Press, 1997), 173–93; Roberto Rabel, "'We Cannot Afford to be Left Too Far Behind Australia': New Zealand's Entry into the Vietnam War in May 1965," *Journal of the Australian War Memorial* 32 (April 1999) <http://www.awm.gov.au/journal/j32/rabel.htm>. *The Journal of the Australian War Memorial* appears exclusively in electronic format and is no longer published on paper.

Although this study is the product of documents found on both sides of the Pacific, including Johnson's taped phone conversations made available in the late 1990s, most of the documents are American. New Zealand is much smaller in population than the United States and, as a result, has a smaller bureaucracy that left far fewer records. Yet, this article shows us that answers to questions about national history are sometimes to be found in foreign archives. In addition, as historians enter the twenty-first century, we should be aware that we as a profession must be ready to adapt to new sources, in this case, audio tape. We must also apply different forums of analysis to these new sources: tone, rate of speech, as well as actual text, are all matters that should be factors in our examinations.

2. Robert Dallek, *Lone Star Rising: Lyndon Johnson and His Times, 1908–1960* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 13–92, 225–67.

3. *Ibid.*, 93–348, 426–543.

4. Sarantakes, "Lyndon Johnson, Foreign Policy, and the Election of 1960," 148–49.

5. Robert Caro, *The Years of Lyndon Johnson, vol. 2, Means of Ascent* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1990), 21–22, 35–45; Dallek, *Lone Star Rising*, 231–41; Remarks Upon Arrival at the Airport, Ohakea, New Zealand, October 19, 1966, *Public Papers of the President: Lyndon B. Johnson* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, various publishing dates), 1966, Vol. 2, 1230 [hereafter cited as *PPP* with appropriate years, volumes, and page numbers].

6. Memorandum of Conversation: The President's Meeting with the New Zealand Minister of Agriculture, April 15, 1964, Folder: New Zealand Memos Vol. I, Box 277, New Zealand Country File, National Security File, Papers of Lyndon Johnson, Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, Texas [hereafter cited as *LBJL*].

7. Ross A. Doughty, *The Holyoake Years* (Palmerston North, New Zealand: Fielding, 1977), 57, 119; Barry Gustafson, *The First 50 Years: A History of the New Zealand National Party* (Auckland, New Zealand: Reed Methuen, 1986), 74.

8. Gustafson, *The First 50 Years*, 106; Keith Eunson, *Mirrors on the Hill: Reflections on New Zealand's Political Leaders* (Palmerston North, New Zealand: Dunmore Press, 2001), 90, 99–100; Tom Brooking, "'Tobacco Road to Pipitea Street': Holyoake and the Farmer-Politician Tradition in New Zealand" in *Sir Keith Holyoake: Towards a Political Biography*, ed. Margaret Clark (Palmerston North, New Zealand: Dunmore Press, 1997), 125.

9. Walt Rostow to Johnson, October 8, 1968, Folder: Visit of Prime Minister Holyoake (2 of 2), Box 277, New Zealand Country File, National Security File, Papers of Lyndon Johnson, *LBJL*; Gustafson, *The First 50 Years*, 76–77; Eunson, *Mirrors on the Hill*, 90; Brooking, "Tobacco Road," 126.

10. Anthony Wood, "Holyoake and the Holyoake Years," in *Sir Keith Holyoake:*

Towards a Political Biography, ed. Margaret Clark (Palmerston North, New Zealand: Dunmore Press, 1997), 44–45; Gustafson, *The First 50 Years*, 93, 96–97, 107.

11. Rabel, “The Dovish Hawk,” 173–93.

12. Statistics from the USDA, Foreign Agricultural Service, Livestock and Meat Division, 88th Congress, 2nd Session, *Congressional Record*, 110 1964: 9375 [hereafter cited as *Congressional Record* with appropriate page number]; *New York Times*, May 31, 1964.

13. Recording of Telephone Conversation between Johnson and Clinton Anderson, July 2, 1964, 11:55 a.m., Citation 4118, Tape WH 6407.01 PNO 18, Recordings of Telephone Conversations—White House Series, Recordings and Transcripts of Conversations and Meetings, LBJL.

14. Recording of Telephone Conversation between Johnson and Jack Miller, January 8, 1964, 6:25 p.m., Citation 1259, Tape WH 6401.09 PNO 5; Recording of Telephone Conversation between Johnson and Anderson, July 2, 1964, 11:55 a.m., Recordings of Telephone Conversations—White House Series, Recordings and Transcripts of Conversations and Meetings, LBJL.

15. *New York Times*, May 31, 1964; *Wall Street Journal*, May 8, 1964; James N. Giglio shows that overproduction was a problem that neither Republican and Democratic administrations had been able to solve. Giglio, “New Frontier Agricultural Policy,” 53–70.

16. *Congressional Record*, 17071.

17. Recording of Telephone Conversation between Johnson and Jack Miller, January 8, 1964, 6:25 p.m.

18. Telcon Memo, January 4, 1964; Telcon Memo, January 7, 1964, Folder: Beef, Box 1, Papers of George Ball, LBJL.

19. Telcon Memo, January 10, 1964, Folder: Beef, Box 1, Papers of George Ball, LBJL; *Evening Post* (Wellington, New Zealand), August 1–14, 1964.

20. Beale to Rusk, February 17, 1964; Ball to Beale, February 17, 1964; Laking to Rusk, February 17, 1964; Ball to Laking, February 17, 1964; *The State Department Bulletin*, vol. 50 (March 9, 1964), 380–82.

21. Shuman to Freeman, February 21, 1964; *Congressional Record*, 3662–63; *Stockman’s Journal* (Omaha), February 19, May 13, 1964.

22. *Congressional Record*, 17141, 20012, 9238.

23. *New York Times*, March 6, 13, 1964.

24. Malcolm McKinnon, “Trading in Difficulties? New Zealand in the World Economy,” in *New Zealand in World Affairs, vol. II, 1957–1972*, ed. Malcolm McKinnon (Wellington: New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 1991), 155; *New York Times*, May 31, 1964.

25. Memorandum of Conversation: The President’s Meeting with the New Zealand Minister of Agriculture, April 15, 1964; United States Department of State, “Guidelines for Policy and Operations: New Zealand,” May 1966, Folder: New Zealand Memos Vol. I, Box 277, New Zealand Country File, National Security File, Papers of Lyndon Johnson, LBJL.

26. “Remarks to the Newspaper Farm Editors Association,” May 12, 1964, *PPP*, 1963–64, Vol. 1, 688; Telcon Memo, April 2, 1964, Folder: Beef, Box 1, Papers of George Ball, LBJL; *Congressional Record*, 9360, 11321.

27. *Sioux City Journal*, March 3, 1964; California State Legislature Resolution, *Congressional Record*, 20105.

28. *St. Louis Globe Democrat*, May 31, 1964; *Denison (Ia.) Bulletin*, August 27, 1964; *Farm Journal*, April 1964; *Norfolk (Neb.) Daily News*, May 12, 1964.

29. *New York Times*, July 29–30, 1964.

30. *New York Times*, August 17, 23, 1964.
31. *New York Times*, August 18, 1964.
32. *Evening Post*, July 21, 31, 1964; *New York Times*, August 23, 1964; Memorandum of Conversation, July 20, 1964, Folder: New Zealand Memos Vol. I, Box 277, New Zealand Country File, National Security File, Papers of Lyndon Johnson, LBJL.
33. Robert M. Blackburn, *Mercenaries and Lyndon Johnson's "More Flags": The Hiring of Korean, Filipino, Thai Soldiers in the Vietnam War* (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 1994), 13–14; ROK stands for Republic of Korea and is pronounced as “rock.” Lodge to Rusk, May 9, 1964, Folder: Vietnam Memos Vol. 23 (2 of 2), Box 11, Vietnam Country File, National Security File, Papers of Lyndon Johnson, LBJL.
34. The memorandum of conversation documenting Holyoake’s visit to the White House in 1964 is two sentences long: “Prime Minister Holyoake met privately with the President. There were no U.S. note takers present.” Memorandum of Conversation, July 20, 1964, Folder: New Zealand Memos Vol. I, Box 277, New Zealand Country File, National Security File, Papers of Lyndon Johnson, LBJL. There is also no record of their meeting in 1968. The abbreviation “FE” stands for Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State. Bundy to Bundy, New Zealand Memos Vol. I, Box 277, New Zealand Country File, National Security File, Papers of Lyndon Johnson, LBJL.
35. At the time of this writing, this letter is still classified at the Johnson Presidential Library, but is available in New Zealand. Johnson to Holyoake, December 12, 1964, ABHS 950, W4627, 478/4/6 Part 4, Records of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, National Archives of New Zealand, Wellington, New Zealand.
36. Rabel, “We Cannot Afford to be Left Too Far Behind Australia,” paragraphs 10, 22; emphasis in the original, Minister of External Affairs to the New Zealand Ambassador in Washington, n.d., attached to Laking to Bundy, December 14, 1964, Folder: Vietnam Memos Vol. 23 (2 of 2), Box 11, Vietnam Country File, National Security File, Papers of Lyndon Johnson, LBJL.
37. Rabel, “We Cannot Afford to be Left Too Far Behind Australia,” paragraphs 26–27; Rabel, “The Dovish Hawk,” 183–84; Bundy to Rusk, Bundy, McNaughton, and Forrestal, December 15, 1964, Folder: Vietnam Memos Vol. 23 (2 of 2), Box 11, Vietnam Country File, National Security File, Papers of Lyndon Johnson, LBJL.
38. Rabel, “The Dovish Hawk,” 174, 186; Roberto Rabel, “Vietnam and the Collapse of the Foreign Policy Consensus,” in *New Zealand in World Affairs, vol. II, 1957–1972*, ed. Malcolm McKinnon (Wellington: New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 1991), 43.
39. *Evening Post*, October 20, 1966; *New Zealand Herald* (Auckland), October 21, 1966; Powell to Bundy, October 14, 1966, Folder: Vol. 4 Backup Material [II], Box 46, National Security Council History, National Security File, Papers of Lyndon Johnson, LBJL.
40. *Evening Post*, October 20–21, 1966; *New Zealand Herald*, October 21, 1966.
41. “Remarks of Welcome at the White House to Prime Minister Holyoake of New Zealand,” October 9, 1968, *PPP*, 1968–1969, Vol. 2, 1016.
42. New Zealand Ambassador in the United States to the Minister of External Affairs, April 15, 1965; “Note for File: Discussions with Mr. Henry Cabot Lodge Held at Wellington on Tuesday, 20 April 1965,” ABHS 950, W4627, 478/4/6 Part 5, Records of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, National Archives of New Zealand, Wellington, New Zealand.
43. Dallek, *Lone Star Rising*, 472; New Zealand Appendix to the Clifford-Taylor Report to the President, August 5, 1967, Folder: Vietnam Allies 5D (1), Box 91, Vietnam Country File, National Security File, Papers of Lyndon Johnson, LBJL; Rabel, “The Dovish Hawk,” 187.

44. Rabel, "Vietnam and the Collapse of the Foreign Policy Consensus," 57–63.
45. Clark Clifford with Richard Holbrooke, *Counsel to the President: A Memoir* (New York: Random House, 1991), 448.
46. Clifford, *Counsel to the President*, 449–50; New Zealand Appendix to the Clifford-Taylor Report to the President, August 5, 1967, Folder: Vietnam Allies 5D (1), Box 91, Vietnam Country File, National Security File, Papers of Lyndon Johnson, LBJL.
47. Rusk to Powell, August 8, 1968, Folder: New Zealand Cables Vol. I; Powell to Johnson, n.d.; "Suggested Talking Points Paper," June 7, 1966, Folder: New Zealand Memos Vol. I; Katzenbach to Johnson, October 7, 1968, Folder: Visit of Prime Minister Holyoake (2 of 2), Box 277, New Zealand Country File, National Security File, Papers of Lyndon Johnson, LBJL; "Toasts of the President and Prime Minister Holyoake of New Zealand," October 9, 1968, *PPP*, 1968–1969, Vol. 2, 1020.
48. Eunson, *Mirrors on the Hill*, 95; Emphasis in the original of Thompson to Valenti, June 24, 1965; Thompson to Johnson, June 22, 1965, Folder: Appointment File June 28, 1965, Box 18, Appointment File (Diary Backup), Papers of Lyndon Johnson; Memorandum of Conversation, June 28, 1965, Folder: New Zealand Memos Vol. I, Box 277, New Zealand Country File, National Security File, Papers of Lyndon Johnson, LBJL.
49. Rostow to Johnson, October 20, 1966, Folder: Vol. 4 Backup Material [II], Box 46, National Security Council Histories, National Security File, Papers of Lyndon Johnson, LBJL; The Government of New Zealand provided a copy of this memorandum of conversation to the United States embassy in Wellington. The contents of the document are enclosed in Embassy to Secretary of State, November 22, 1966, Folder: Manila Conference and Pres. Asian Trip Vol. II, Box 45, National Security Council Histories, National Security File, Papers of Lyndon Johnson, LBJL.
50. Henning to Secretary of State, October 3, 1968, Folder: Visit of Prime Minister Holyoake (1 of 2), Box 277, New Zealand Country File, National Security File, Papers of Lyndon Johnson, LBJL.
51. "Extstaff" is an abbreviation for the Ministry of External Affairs. DOD stands for the U.S. Department of Defense, and GNZ is the Government of New Zealand. Henning to Secretary of State, October 3 and 4, 1968, Folder: Visit of Prime Minister Holyoake (1 of 2), Box 277, New Zealand Country File, National Security File, Papers of Lyndon Johnson, LBJL.
52. Katzenbach to Johnson, October 7, 1968, Folder: Visit of Prime Minister Holyoake (2 of 2), Box 277, New Zealand Country File, National Security File, Papers of Lyndon Johnson, LBJL.
53. Photo Contact Sheet Book, October 9, 1968, photo #A6933-23a, Audio Visual Material; Rostow to the Secretary of Defense, December 5, 1968, Folder: New Zealand Memos Vol. I; Rostow to Johnson, October 9, 1968; Katzenbach to Johnson, October 7, 1968, Folder: Visit of Prime Minister Holyoake (2 of 2), Box 277, New Zealand Country File, National Security File; Administrative Histories, State Department, Vol. I, Chapter VII, Part N, "Australia and New Zealand," p. 15, Special Files, Papers of Lyndon Johnson, LBJL.
54. "Joint Statement Following Discussions with Prime Minister Holyoake of New Zealand," October 10, 1968, *PPP*, 1968–1969, Vol. 2, 1025.