

These activities entailed great risks; their detection would have meant imprisonment and perhaps even execution for all involved, although Van Lew's gender probably would have spared her from the gallows. Varon well describes how Elizabeth, her mother and sister deflected attention from their actions by exploiting the stereotypes that defined women in their community. To explain the most visible acts of kindness toward Union prisoners and maltreated slaves, the family emphasized that it was the duty of Christians to care for the suffering, no matter their sectional orientation or skin color. Varon vividly chronicles the cat-and-mouse game that Van Lew and her family played to keep one step ahead of nosey neighbors, the city's provost marshal, and others who suspected her treasonous acts. More than once the network appeared on the verge of detection, but fortuitous events and the built-in protections afforded a woman of high standing saved her and her operatives every time.

By the end of the war, Van Lew's work became known to many Northerners, and the intelligence she placed in the hands of Major General George Gordon Meade, commander of the Army of the Potomac, and Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant, commander of the Union's field armies during the last year of the conflict, cemented her identity as a Union patriot. The honor was counter-balanced by her exclusion from postwar Richmond society. Her neighbors reviled and shunned her, while the social leaders of the city barred her from their circle. A woman of lesser will would have fled Richmond for points north, but Van Lew lived out her life there. Her refusal to run and her steadfast devotion to a cause that became more acceptable with the passage of time, even in Confederate Virginia, won her the grudging admiration of at least some of those who had vilified her as an apostate and derided her as a crazy woman.

In later life Van Lew would become a leading spokesperson for equality for national reunion and racial harmony. In 1869 President Grant appointed her as Postmistress of Richmond, a position never held by a woman but one that sustained her economically for eight years. Her views so alienated the conservative Republicans who were in power that in 1877 President Rutherford B. Hayes, having won a disputed election on the promise to end Reconstruction, replaced her with a Confederate veteran. As the 'Lost Cause' spirit gained force in the South, Van Lew became a recluse as well as an outcast from local society, although it seems highly unlikely that she would have moderated her views had she foreseen the consequences.

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J. Charles Schencking, *Making Waves: Politics, Propaganda, and the Emergence of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1868–1922* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005). Pp.283. \$57.95. Hb. ISBN 0-8047-4977-9.

Of the four major combatant navies of the twentieth century (Imperial Japanese, Royal, US, and Imperial German/German), the Imperial Japanese Navy remains the least known outside its own national home. After more than 17 years of work, J. Charles Schencking offers an important study of this service that individuals in both Japanese and naval history should put on their reading lists. He argues that there was an 'important interplay between power, pageantry, politics, propaganda, and

nationalism that contributed to, and reflected, the rise of the modern Japanese navy' (p.2).

This book will be of interest to those individuals concerned with the politics of national security. It might strike many as surprising that in Japan, an island nation, the need for a navy was not self-evident the way it was in the United Kingdom. Yet such was the case and Schencking shows that the navy worked hard to develop support among the public, members of the Diet, and industry. Once the navy became independent of the army, budget appropriations became a political issue, decided in the legislature, since it had taxing authority in the constitutional structure of Imperial Japan. Rather than being a force that thwarted the development of political parties, the navy actively sought out supporters among these organizations and helped facilitate the growth of political parties.

Rivalry with the army was always present, but the navy's decisive contributions to the Sino-Japanese and the Russo-Japanese Wars gave it leverage. Chapter five on the aftermath of the Battle of Tsushima in this second conflict is almost worth the price of the book itself, which is saying something given its high cost. With this study, Schencking adds greater historiographical weight to the efforts of historians to show that public support, or at least consent, for government policies was necessary even though Imperial Japan was hardly a democracy. The end of this book with the rise of the era of naval arms limitation agreements makes sense.

No book is perfect, and this one is no exception. The chapters on parliamentary maneuverings seem to be a little too detailed and tedious. Robert Caro proved with the third volume of his biography of Lyndon Johnson that won the Pulitzer Prize that the drama of legislative politics can make for engaging reading, but Schencking makes his contribution with his argument and impressive research rather than with the quality of his prose. Although the focus of this book is on the expansion of the navy, which is inherently an administrative, and political process, chapters on the combat operations of the navy during the three wars it fought during this period would have given the study a more comprehensive feel and shown how these events proved to be assets to the efforts of naval expansionists. Such sections might have also helped combat the biggest problem with this study, which is more the work of the publisher than the author: its price. At \$57.95, this book will never enjoy the audience it deserves.

Such complaints might seem minor to many, and what readers of this review should note is that the strengths of this work far outweigh its imperfections. Anyone interested in the politics of national security should put this book on their reading lists.

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James Gleeson, *Bloody Sunday. How Michael Collins' Agents Assassinated Britain's Secret Service in Dublin on November 21, 1920* (Guildford, CT: The Lyons Press, 2004). Pp.212. \$13.95. Pb. ISBN 1-59228-282-2.

This is a strangely timed reissue of a book originally published in 1962. The only change to the original is the inclusion of an enthusiastic and completely uncritical introduction by Dermot McEvoy which reveals no awareness of the enormous developments in knowledge and understanding of the Irish revolutionary period in the last four decades.