

(120). Public opinion, an earlier constraint, was now instrumental in Roosevelt's public policy shift.

Why then, asks Casey, did Roosevelt pursue a cautious approach to public pronouncements of his strong attitudes toward Nazi Germany and what brought the change? In addition to some of the reasons already explored, Casey forwards additional observations: That both U.S. and British intelligence communities came to the conclusion that most Germans supported their criminal regime, and that "unconditional surrender" would be in the interest of the United States as it sought to cement relationships with Stalin. Finally, Roosevelt arrived at the realization that the collapse of the Nazi regime would not solve the German problem. Yet even late in the war, Roosevelt's hardening attitudes toward Germany were not fully shared by the public. The administration's own reluctance to utter in public earlier its hardening views were to be blamed. Yet, seeking to avoid public arguments over his policy toward Germany, Roosevelt opted for a gap between private attitudes and public statements. Only in the summer and fall of 1944 did Roosevelt make a public statement about total surrender and punitive actions against Germany, as well as about occupation, denazification, and short-term economic control.

The book is sophisticated and very well written. For scholars of Roosevelt, the book supports long-held assessments of Roosevelt as cautious, optimistic, a master politician who loved political maneuvers and a consummate tactician who was not trapped by ideological principles. Casey's research is extensive, probing, and original. His sources are rich and his coverage is intelligent. His use of public opinion polls is extensive and very informative. Casey is well informed by reading many speeches, statements, and private messages. He explores many angles to forward an intricate view of Roosevelt as an optimist, yet one who was cautious, clear about his policies, yet possessing a keen understanding of how far he could push them in public. Above all else, Roosevelt mastered the art of timing, pursuing his policies and their public pronouncements with patience. Casey presents a keen understanding of the rhetorical, and his critical reading of political discourse is informed by detailed events. This book should be of interest to scholars interested in history, political science, political communication, and public opinion.

Amos Kiewe

Syracuse University

The Rhetorical Presidency, Propaganda, and the Cold War, 1945–1955. By Shawn J. Parry-Giles. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002; pp xxix + 230. \$61.95.

For those of you who like reviews that get straight to the point, here we go: Shawn J. Parry-Giles has written an important work that every serious student of rhetoric, the presidency, and the Cold War should read. Unfortunately, this title will not receive the audience it deserves due to the high price the publisher has assigned.

Although Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower are not remembered as the most gifted residents of the White House at rhetorical undertakings, Parry-Giles argues, "Truman and Eisenhower were the first two presidents to introduce and mobilize propaganda as an official *peacetime* institution. In a 'war of words,' propaganda acted as an integral component of the government's foreign policy operation" (xvii).

In this solidly researched study, drawing on documents housed at the Truman and Eisenhower presidential libraries as well as at the U.S. National Archives, Parry-Giles calls for an expansion of the traditional understanding of the rhetorical presidency to include covert communication campaigns. In the body of her work, she makes a strong case for her position, showing how propaganda efforts went from a journalist paradigm to a military one when that earlier effort proved ineffective. The journalistic approach was an information campaign designed to get accurate material about the United States, often written or produced by working journalists and appearing in established media outlets. The expectation policymakers had was that such information would work to the advantage of the United States, if they could just get it to foreign audiences. The military way was often called "psychological warfare," was usually covert, and had the main mission of defending U.S. foreign policy.

As the United States militarized its communication campaigns, the propaganda agencies developed efforts to increase dissent behind the Iron Curtain with the overall objective of achieving, according to a document Parry-Giles quotes, the "reversal of Russian communism." She states that this goal was "a key U.S. foreign policy objective" in the 1950s (82). In advancing this idea, Parry-Giles challenges the position that historian John Lewis Gaddis advanced in *Strategies of Containment* (1981) that U.S. foreign policy objectives were designed to limit Soviet influence rather than destroy the Communist regime. Since then political scientist Greg Mitrovich and others have argued that U.S. policymakers wanted to eliminate the Soviet Union. This work would support this new view of a much more aggressive or combative foreign policy. One of the key considerations in this debate will be the dominant view at the various policymaking levels of the foreign policy bureaucracy. It is one thing for the chair of an interdepartmental group to write that the U.S. government wants to do X, Y, and Z. It is another thing for the president of the United States and his senior advisors to commit the nation to such ambitions. On this matter, Parry-Giles is silent.

Even though this book is an important work, some of Parry-Giles's arguments seemed strained. Her claims that the U.S. propaganda agencies used the *New York Times* as a way around congressional prohibitions on domestic activities assumes a degree of influence for that paper of which its editors and reporters could only dream. While the *Times* might be an important outlet of opinion and information and strives to be the paper of record, not many people living in Louisville, Kentucky; San Diego, California; or Houston, Texas, were regular readers—particularly in the

era before satellite communications—and could not have been influenced by whatever the staff of that paper put on its pages. More importantly, her claim that propaganda prolonged the Cold War is dubious. The conflicting foreign policy agendas of the United States and the Soviet Union might have had more to do with the duration of this period in international affairs than the information and propaganda policies of the United States.

Overall, this book provides much food for thought even if one cannot accept all of the conclusions it contains. The readership of this journal with research and teaching interests in relevant areas should have their home libraries purchase a copy of this study, read it, and contemplate the arguments contained on its pages.

Nicholas Evan Sarantakes

Texas A&M University—Commerce

Nixon's Civil Rights: Politics, Principles, and Policy. By Dean J. Kotlowski. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001; pp vii + 404. \$35.00.

Although this book does not share the tenor or outlook of recent revisionist scholarship, Kotlowski does invite his readers to reevaluate their assumptions about President Nixon's civil rights policies. Drawing upon an impressive stock of archival materials, he details the motives, decision making, enactment, and outcomes of the Nixon administration's policies related to black civil rights, women's rights, and Native American policy. In short, Kotlowski claims that both political drives and a sense of what was right motivated Nixon's civil rights policies, that those policies were the product of a rather ad hoc administrative process, that those policies were often more progressive than Nixon's retrogressive rhetoric would suggest, and that those policies—and the president's orientation to civil rights issues—had an enduring effect on American life and political culture.

The bulk of the book (chapters 1–5) addresses Nixon's policies on school desegregation, fair housing, voting rights, affirmative action, and minority economic development. The insights of each case study come from Kotlowski's ability to capture the difficulties Nixon faced in balancing personal concerns, public duties, conflicting advice, and political consequences. For instance, the claim that the Supreme Court's 1969 ruling in *Alexander v. Holmes County* "bewildered the White House" (3) is supported by a thorough account of the mixture of philosophical, political, and practical considerations that guided Nixon's policies on school desegregation. And though he often is unsympathetic to Nixon's approach to civil rights, Kotlowski does appreciate the complex political configuration in which the president labored. Two additional features of these case studies make them remarkable. First, Kotlowski presents a valuable account of Nixon's civil rights outlook during his years in Congress and as vice president in order to explain his words and deeds as president. Second, he demonstrates Nixon's historical influence by examining the