

Book Reviews

acumen, and breadth of knowledge, because this study expands Smith's contributions significantly. Locating Smith in the broader developments of the social history of art, and of art criticism, as well as in the history of ideas about culture, colonialism, and social theory, is an important accomplishment. But I have to wonder if the book could not have been written down, written more accessibly, without these contributions being dumbed down in any way. Had that happened, this thorough and challenging assessment of a figure as important as Bernard Smith would have had appeal and value well beyond the scope of the Pacific, of anthropology and of art history and social criticism. In spite of a jacket copy which trumpets the book's approachability, however, I fear that it will find only a small audience of specialists when both Beilharz's and Smith's insights deserve broader recognition. The conundrum of this book, then, is not unlike the conundrum of much of Smith's own work. It's very success becomes, in a broader sense, the heart of its failure as well.

Univ. of Western Ontario, London, Canada DOUGLASS DROZDOW-ST. CHRISTIAN

GUARDIANS OF EMPIRE: The U.S. Army and the Pacific, 1902-1940.

By Brian McAllister Linn. Chapel Hill (North Carolina): University of North Carolina Press. 1997. xvi, 343 pp. (Photos, maps.) US\$39.95, cloth. ISBN 0-8078-2321-X.

ONE of the simplest questions in the book business is often the most difficult to answer: So what? Why does the world need a new study on any particular subject? In this book, Brian Linn explores the prewar U.S. Army in the Pacific, a subject that begs the "so what" question. He, however, offers the reader an extremely innovative argument. He persuasively shows that the initial U.S. defeats in World War II were the logical outcome of policies the United States pursued for decades in the region. Various sessions of Congress and assorted presidential administrations neglected the bases and units stationed on Hawaii and the Philippines. The army only made the situation worse. Military planners refused to accept or recognize the limitations in which the armed forces operated. Local staff officers created defensive plans that were "based on nonexistent troops, weapons, supplies, housing and finances" (p. 193). Army headquarters in Washington D.C. made no effort to make units in the field develop plans within the larger parameters of overall U.S. strategy.

The Hawaiian and Philippine installations developed differently. Taking and securing the Hawaiian islands was quite easy, given the fact that U.S. nationals lived there in large numbers and that Japan, the only nation with interests in the region, lacked the technological resources to stage an attack on the U.S. forces stationed on Oahu. Hawaii quickly became the first line

of defense for the continental United States. The Philippines were a whole different story. The Filipino people resisted U.S. rule and the Americans found themselves in a dirty little guerilla war to establish their authority. For years afterwards, the U.S. military was uncertain about the loyalty of the indigenous population. This concern complicated the mission of the units stationed in the Philippines. These detachments faced a real and viable external threat. Local commanders and their subordinates realized they were within striking distance of the Japanese military, but were unsure the allegiance the Filipinos would take in such a conflict. As a result, planners counted on using only regular units in the defense of the archipelago and figured it would take six divisions, a force roughly equal to that of the entire active duty army then in the continental United States. Other commanders focused on solving short-term technical issues, which they often did. Many officers refused to consider larger strategic questions which often led to unpleasant negative conclusions.

The strengths of this study are threefold. First, Linn in innovative fashion shows the disparity between ends and means with several chapters that focus on the daily lives of the soldiers and their interaction with the communities in both archipelagos. The powerful and first-rate research behind this book is another asset. The 26 page bibliography lists 249 books and 122 manuscript collections in 17 different archives located in 11 different states. Finally, Linn brings an expertise and solid understanding of the events based on previous work on the American conquest of the Philippines to bear in this account.

The shortcomings of this book are quite minor but stem, ironically, from its very strengths. The first two chapters assume a heavy familiarity with the events in the Philippines during the first years of the American presence. While necessary to explain the origins of the U.S. presence, these chapters do little to advance the overall thesis of the book. The two maps included are inadequate in detail for those unfamiliar with the geography of either Hawaii or the Philippines. These flaws, however, take little away from the overall strength of this study.

Texas A&M University, Commerce, U.S.A.

NICHOLAS EVAN SARANTAKES

THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS: ASEAN and Canada. *By Paul J. Davidson. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 1997. xii, 200 pp. S\$49.90/US\$35.00, paper. ISBN 981-3055-40-5.*

LITTLE has been written on Pacific international economic organizations from the perspective of international law. Paul Davidson, of Carleton University's Department of Law, is here aiming to fill that void. The book springs from the premise that international law, along with national law,